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conclusions. Adopting the empirical method of the modern
scientists, Hume indicated that knowledge of the world could
be no more than phenomenalistic. That is, if our experience is
stringently limited to appearances, we can draw no conclusion beyond these appearances. As a result of Hume's criticism, one of the unsolved problems bequeathed to us by the
17th century is the rational justification of inductive reasoning. If this problem did not lead us to an utter scepticism, it
would not be so urgent and unsettling: "Either there is something about the immediate occasion which affords knowledge
of the past and future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism
as to memory and induction" (Whitehead, 1925:46).

While modem science has made important contributions to the
advance of learning, Hume has pointed out that a crucial element of its
methodology is seriously flawed. His analysis concluded that there is
no rational justification for inductive reasoning. Viewed from another
perspective, the point of Hume's criticism would seem to be that the
scientist's faith in the order of nature is without any ground in nature.
Whitehead found Hume's analysis to be profoundly unsettling because it leads to such utter skepticism. Whitehead believed the key to
induction is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate
occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. If one turns to experience in all of its fullness, then it will be seen that Hume's analysis
deals only in abstract considerations and not in the concrete occasions
of experience.
By returning to the immediate occasion of experience Whitehead
believed that the essential relatedness of nature will be discovered.
It is this relatedness, which is discovered in our pre-analytic knowledge,
that provides the ground for our faith in the order of nature and
justifies inductive reasoning.

t

t

Whitehead (1925:46) believed that " ... the key to the
process of induction, as used either in science or in our ordinary life, is to be found in the right understanding of the
immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness."
Our difficulties arise when we substitute for the concrete
occasion an abstract consideration in which we attend only
to material objects as fluctuating configurations in space and
time. So abstracted, objects reveal only their positions, disclosing nothing of their mutual dependencies. Accordingly,
we must observe the immediate occasion and use reason to
discover a general description of its nature.

t

Francis Bacon was among the first to realize explicitly
the antithesis between deductive rationalism of the medieval
scholastics and inductive observational methods of the moderns. However, induction proved to be somewhat more complex than Bacon had anticipated. He felt that if sufficient care
were taken in the collection of cases the general law itself
would stand out. Later scientific investigations have revealed
that this is an inadequate account of the procedures which
issue in scientific generalizations. Nevertheless, Bacon was one
of the prophets of the historical revolt, which overturned the
method of rationalism, and rushed to the opposite extreme,
which held that all fruitful knowledge was based upon inf~rence from particular instances in the past to particular
hstances in the future (Whitehead, 1925 :44-45).

Both Hume and Whitehead started their arguments from
experience; where did the Humean analysis go astray? First,
Whitehead denied Hume's view of experience as a mere succession of loose events. That is, Whitehead denied that the immediately given of experience is sensory atoms. But more
basically, a false assumption underlies Hume's approach to
immediate experience.
This assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature
during the modern period. It is grounded in the answer that
the 17th century philosophers gave to the Ionian thinkers'

It was Hume's (in Selby-Bigge, 1888:139 and 1902:

72-79) good fortune to show that such an unguarded
conception of induction would lead to totally unwarranted
(;3,
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questions, "What is the world made of?" Their answer was
that the world is a succession of instantaneous configurations
of matter or material (Whitehead, 1925: 51). Science rested
content with this assumption as to the fundamental elements
of nature, for the great forces of nature were determined by
the configurations of masses. These configurations determined
their own changes, completely closing the circle of scientific
thought. This mechanistic theory justified itself by the pragmatic test.
If this mechanistic materialism is accepted, i. e., if there is
a presupposition of nature at a point-instant (as Newtonian
science presumed), then causality is, as Hume pointed out,
merely a "habit" or "custom" with no counterpart in nature.
However, such a theory involves the error of mistaking the
abstract for the concrete. It is an example of what Whitehead
(1925 :52) called the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness."
More specifically it involves setting up distinctions which disregard the genuine interconnections of things. Due to "Misplaced Concreteness" the real continuity of experience is
atomized, and temporal duration is denied.
More specifically, what is entailed is a sub-fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness: the concept of simple location. By
simple location Whitehead (1925: 50) meant " ... one major
characteristic which refers equally both to space and to time,
and other minor characteristics which are diverse as between
space and time." The fallacy of simple location occurs when it
is assumed that in expressing the space and time relations of a
bit of material, it is unnecessary to say more than it is present
at a specific point in space at a specific instant of time. "The
characteristic common both to space and time is that material
can be said to be here in space and here in time, or here in
space-time, in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation any reference to other regions of
space-time" (Whitehead, 1925:50). Once it is determined
what is meant by definite place, the relation of a specific material bit to space and time can be adequately stated by saying
that it is simply in that place, and there is nothing more to
be stated regarding that particular bit of matter.
Regarding the minor characteristics which were mentioned above, Whitehead undertook some subordinate explanations. With respect to time, dividing the time does not divide
the material that existed in a longer period of time. However,
with respect to space, dividing the volume does divide the
material that existed previously in the undivided volume of
space. That is, if material exists throughout a volume, there
will be less of that material distributed throughout any given
portion of that volume. Such considerations lead Whitehead
(1925: 51) to the interesting conclusion that the lapse of time
is accidental, rather than essential to the character of the
material. The material is equally itself at any instant of time,
or any sub-period of that instant.

If the concept of simple location is held, difficulties arise
immediately. If a material configuration has no inherent relation or reference to configurations in any other times, past or
future, it immediately follows that nature within any period is
not connected to nature in any other time, that nature is, as
Hume's analysis draws out, "loose and separate." If there is no
inherent reference, Hume's "external objects" offer no ground
for the justification of inductive reasoning. Consequently,
Hume was correct: the only alternative for grounding inductive reasoning is the mind. If there is no basis in nature for any
justification of the order nature displays, this order must be
mind-imposed since in reality it is mind-based. That is, the
consistent contiguity and temporal succession observed in
nature are in reality a random sense manifold; and, since we
observe no necessary connection or power in nature itself, the
order of nature is really the order of mind.
By accepting mechanistic materialism, which was the basis
of Galilean-Copernican-Newtonian universe, Hume brought
about a unique turn of events for empiricism, especially a
highly empirical scientific methodology. If one of the aims of
science is projection (i.e., prediction either into the future or
the past), mechanistic materialism's fallacy of simple location
prohibits this attempt. Since material configurations lack
inherent reference, there is nothing in the present observed
nature that could possiblY enable the scientist to project either
to composition of past configurations or future configurations.
The most he could do is consider nature at the present, cataloguing his observations of the present from instant to instant.
Any projection beyond the present would be futile guesswork,
since the observed present has no inherent reference to any
unobserved future or past. At best there could be an accidental
relationship between the observed and unobserved. But an
accidental relationship in nature would not offer any basis for
a legitimate scientific knowledge of the physical world, since
our knowledge of nature would be as random as the occasional
relationships. In brief, when Hume accepted mechanistic
materialism, his analysis poignantly pointed out that one
could not go beyond what Whitehead (1925:52) was later to
call the fallacy of the simple location of here and now. Consequently, insofar as a scientific methodology is based on this
fallacy, it is bound to a succession of present here and now's.
Inasmuch as mechanistic materialism passed the pragmatic
test, it has been highly successful. Philosophically speaking,
however, it posed an insurmountable obstacle, and "the only
wonder is that the world did in fact wait for Hume before
noting the difficulty." The point of Hume's analysis, then,
would seem to be that scientists' simple faith in the order of
nature was without any ground in nature.
Having just seen that Hume's challenge is unanswerable,
if we grant his premise of mechanistic materialism, we can see
that Whitehead was forced to return to a new analysis of
nature, if he were to remain empirical and yet justify inductive
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reasoning. In analyzing our immediate experience, Whitehead
(1925:57) found that among the primary elements of nature
as apprehended, there is no element whatever which possesses
this character of simple location.
Whitehead argued that Hume, by neglecting the causal
mode of perception, missed the essential relatedness of things,
and by missing the essential relatedness of things, slipped into
sceptism. According to Whitehead (1927: 17), in our experience we discern two distinct modes of direct perception of
the external world: perception in the mode of causal efficacy
and perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.
When a person vaguely prehends data, which are felt as coming
into the experience of the subject from the past, through the
mediation of the body, this is causal efficacy (Whitehead,
1929: 184, 189, 266-267). (Whitehead also discerned in a
mbject's experience a vague feeling of "on-going" toward
[he future.) Presentational immediacy, on the other hand, is
ill experience of clear-cut sense data definitely located, with
,ill emphasis on the present and a minimum of reference to
:Jast or future (Whitehead, 1927:13-29 and 1929:185,271).
There is a close relation between these two modes of per.:eption. The sense data of presentational immediacy are
derived from the data of causal efficacy. A Significant change
m the characteristics of these data occurs in this derivation.
In the mode of presentational immediacy what (in causal
efficacy) was vague in quality and function becomes clear and
distinct (Whitehead, 1929:262). For example, a subject vaguely experiences pain as derived from the body. This perception
i, in the mode of causal efficacy. When this pain is clearly
apprehended as localized, there is perception in the mode of
r resentational immediacy. Hence, the later mode of percepLon is found only in organisms of a high grade (Whitehead,
] 929:261).
Since data in the mode of presentational immediacy are
ciear and distinct, it is this mode of perception that is the
b [sis of all exact measurements (Whitehead, 1929:197-499).
Vhitehead granted the importance of this mode of perception;
h lwever, he also offered very vigorous criticisms of this
e: sentially abstract approach to the complex of environment.
IJ presentational immediacy (or, to speak less technically, in
o dinary sense experience), there is a tendency to assign excessi,ce importance to clear-cut and apparently unrelated bits of
St'1se data. According to Whitehead (1929:263), this is precisely what Hume did, for in Hume's theory response is to preSt '1tational immediacy and nothing else.
Whitehead contended, contrary to Hume, that there can
bt an impression of causality. For example, when a bright
!ifht is presented as a stimulus, a man blinks. In the terms of
H:.~ mode of presentational immediacy the sequence of the
p( 'cepts is: flash of light, feeling of eye-closure, and instant
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darkness. Although these three percepts are practically simultaneous, the flash maintains its priority over the other two;
and the priority of the last two percepts is indistinguishable.
In Whitehead's philosophy of organism, the man also experiences another percept in the mode of causal efficacy. "He
feels that the experiences of the eye in the matter of the flash
are causal of the blink" (Whitehead, 1929:265). The man who
experiences this does not doubt it. Actually, it is the very
feeling of causality which enables the man to distinguish the
priority of the flash over the blink and instant darkness. If
asked why he blinked, the man will reply, "The flash made me
blink." And, if asked how he knows this, he will reply, "I
know it, because I felt it."
Whitehead's view differed from Hume's here because he
accepted the man's statement. Hume, however, would have
stated that in our perception (Whitehead's mode of presentational immediacy) there is found no percept of flash causing
the man to blink. In our experience there are simply the two
percepts: the flash and the blink. Hume refused to admit the
datum that the compulsion to blink was indeed felt by the
man. Whitehead contended that Hume could not admit this
datum, because he was correct that there is no such datum in
his view of percepts. Whitehead replied, however, that our
view of percepts must be broadened to take in such a percept
as "cause." Hume would have interpreted that what the man
really felt was his habit of blinking after flashes and not
causality. Whitehead (1929:266), then, asked Hume:
But how can a "habit" be felt, when a "cause" cannot be felt? Is there any presentational immediacy
in the feeling of a "habit"? ... by a sleight of hand
[you] confuse a "habit of feeling blinks after flashes"
with a ''feeling of the habit of feeling blinks after
flashes."
The notion of causality did not arise from clear and distinct
impressions of experience, but rather because man experiences
in the mode of causal efficacy.
By presentational immediacy we are made aware of the
observed world as illustrated and made vivid by certain sensa.
While in this mode, we discern no referential qualities, and we
merely see the sensa disposed in a particular manner. Hume
took presentational immediacy to be the primary fact in perception, and he held that whatever is to be posited in the
perceived world should be derivable from this fact. In opposition to this view, Whitehead held causal efficacy is more
fundamental than presentational immediacy. In fact, as was
pointed out above, causal efficacy is at the root of all our
objective experience. This mode can actually be called causal
feeling (Das, 1938:132).
Because they have not properly considered the real character of time, philosophers have found it easy to overlook
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the feeling of causal efficacy. Time is primarily recognized as
the succession of our acts or experience, and derivatively as
the succession of events objectively perceived in those acts.
However, there is no such a thing as mere succession. According to Whitehead (1925: 52), Bergson rightly called this a distortion of nature due to the intellectual "spatialization" of
things. In the concrete, succession is the conformation of one
event to another, of the later to the earlier. There is no such
thing as the lapse of empty time, but only a succession of
events, which· means that every event is derived from its predecessor to which it conforms in some fashion. The flow of
time is really the causal flow of events, in which the later
events must conform to earlier ones. Time is irreversible
(Das, 1938:134). When one considers the idea of empty time,
mere succession, he is considering an abstraction from the
concrete fact of immediate experience. This is an error, an
accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete
(Whitehead,I925:52).
The feeling of causal efficacy, although deep and inescapable, and heavy with emotion, fails to capture its due
measure of recognition, because our attention is held by the
clarity and distinctness of what we get in the mode of presentational immediacy. Because this clarity and distinctness captured Hume's attention, he took presentational immediacy to
be the only mode of perception. Taking presentational immediacy as the only mode of perception, he priorly assumed that
time is pure succession. That is, if one assumes that time is
pure succession, one will consequently take presentational
immediacy to be primary in perception. As noted above, to
take time as pure succession is an example of the fallacy of
Misplaced Concreteness.
How is this so? The notion of pure succession is analogous to a notion of color. In our concrete, immediate experience we never discover mere color, but always a red or blue
and so on. Analogously, we never discern pure succession,
" ... but always some particular relational ground in respect
to which of the terms succeed each other" (Whitehead, 1927:
35). Integers succeed one another in one way, and events
succeed each other in another way. When these ways of succession are abstracted, it is discovered that pure succession is
an abstraction of the second order. That is, we have a generic
abstraction omitting the temporal character of time and
numerical relation of integers. In our concrete, immediate experience, time is known to us as the succession of our acts of
experience. And, as indicated above, this succession is not
pure succession, but rather it is the derivation of state from
state, with the later state exhibiting a conformity to the antecedent. In reality time is experienced as the conformation of
state to state, the later conforming to the earlier. Pure succession, then, is an abstraction from the irreversible relationship of settled past to derivative present (Whitehead, 1927:
35). The past consists of a community of settled acts which,

insofar as they are objectified in the present act, set the
conditions to which that act must conform (Whitehead,
1927:36).
Employing Aristotlian terms, Whitehead (1927:36) wrote:
... we say that the limitations of pure potentiality,
established by "objectifications" of the settled past,
expresses that "natural potentiality" -or, potentiality
in nature - which is "matter" with that basis of initial, realized form presupposed as the first phase in
the self-creation of the present occasion. The notion
of "pure potentiality" here takes the place of Aristotle's "matter," and "natural potentiality" is "matter" with that given imposition of form from which
each actual thing arises.
The constitutive elements which are given for experience can
be found by analyzing natural potentiality. The immediate
present, then, must conform to what the past is for it (Whitehead, 1927 :36), and pure succession is an abstraction from the
more concrete relatedness of conformation. The substantial
character of actual things expresses the stubborn fact that
whatever is actually determined must be conformed to by the
determinable present. In other words, the unobserved must
conform to the observed in some degree. (The phrase "in some
degree" is used designedly here, for there is novelty in the unobserved.) According to Hume, there are no stubborn facts of
immediate experience, for it is "habit" or "custom" alone that
remains recalcitrant when all is said and done. To conclude,
let us quote Whitehead (1927:37):
Hume's doctrine may be good philosophy, but it is
certainly not common sense. In other words, it fails
the final test of obvious verification.
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